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Abstract:
In my lifetime, the accounting industry has experienced many downfalls. Due to the
myriad of scandals that rocked America’s marketplace in the 2000’s, accountants and investors
alike saw the need for reworking within the industry. With this desire for change came the
passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act into law on July 30, 2002.
The purpose of the project is to explore the accounting scandals that took place prior to
enacting Sarbanes-Oxley. Although it is important to acknowledge that there were other
accounting scandals that took place, such as Tyco, HealthSouth, Freddie Mac, this paper focuses
specifically on the Enron and WorldCom scandals and how these two scandals played a large
role in the need for and creation of Sarbanes-Oxley. By studying the environment of these
businesses that led to their fraud, one can see a direct correlation between the issues at Enron and
WorldCom and how SOX was designed to prevent those issues at other publicly traded
companies.
This project also contains interviews with people connected to and affected by the
passing of SOX. The first person I interviewed is Dr. Joseph Carcello. Dr. Carcello is the
Accounting and Information Management Department Head at The University of Tennessee,
Knoxville. He also has served on the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)’s
Standing Advisory Group, and he currently is a charter member of the PCAOB’s Investor
Advisory Group. The second person that I interviewed for this project is Barry Elkins who
worked 12 years in the public accounting industry and later became the CFO and Senior Vice
President of Direct General Corporation. He held his position at Direct General when the
company went public in 2003, thus has firsthand experience with the changes that were
implemented with the passing of Sarbanes-Oxley.
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Introduction:
Prior to the accounting scandals of the 2000’s, the accounting industry was mostly a selfregulated industry. Although the SEC had entrusted its authority to set accounting standards to
FASB, auditors were a self-regulated group governed solely by the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants’ (AICPA) auditing standards. However, the scandals that took
place, such as Enron and WorldCom, revealed deeply hidden issues within American businesses
and the accounting profession in general. According to Paul Krugman of The New York Times,
“the Enron debacle is not just the story of a company that failed; it is the story of a system that
failed. And the system didn’t fail through carelessness or laziness; it was corrupted.” Although
the stories of accounting fraud and corruption are mostly the exception, not the rule, the need for
changes within the accounting industry became indisputable when the world began to see the
destruction that the scandals caused with regard to the average American. People all across the
country were suffering at the hands of overpaid, overzealous executives of some of the largest
companies in America.
The Enron scandal alone cost thousands of employees and investors their retirement
account, shareholders lost $74 billion, and the employees were all let go. With the WorldCom
scandal, 300,000 jobs were lost and investors saw losses of $180 million (“The 10 Worst
Corporate Accounting Scandals of All Time”). With similar numbers seen in every major
accounting scandal, the need for changes within the industry could not be ignored any longer. On
July 30, 2002, congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act with the hopes of regaining the
confidence of investors worldwide and decreasing the possibility of the American markets being
devastated by scandals again.
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Business Industry Before Scandals and SOX:
Prior to the accounting scandals, the American marketplace was booming. The American
people felt as though they could not lose by investing in the stock market. It appeared as though
America, the people and the country, could not fail. Within the public accounting industry there
was almost zero regulation from outside of the profession entrusting auditors with a great deal of
power and responsibility (Garner 17). Accounting firms audited/regulated each other, which led
to an “I’ll scratch your back, if you scratch mine” relationship (Carcello). The absence of outside
regulation also led to the firms emphasizing their consulting practices over any other department
(Garner 17). With this lack of regulation, also came a deep intertwining between the firms and
the corporations they audited. The close relationships between auditors and clients were partially
attributed to years of continuous auditing (sometimes close to 20 years). This fact is, without a
doubt, a major factor in the downfall of Arthur Andersen, one of what was then the “Big 5”
accounting firms. The “Big 5” consisted of: Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst &
Young, KPMG Peat Marwick, and PricewaterhouseCoopers. Within this group, each firm was
regarded as extremely trustworthy, as well as knowledgeable within the accounting industry. In
fact, according to Public Broadcasting Services (PBS), Arthur Andersen was “once known as the
gold standard of integrity in auditing” (“Bigger Than Enron”). All of that changed, however,
with the fall of Enron.

Enron and Arthur Andersen:
Enron Corporation was a company based out of Houston, Texas that was established in
1985 and focused its business on a number of different commodities related to energy (Messier
712). By the 1990’s, Enron had become one of largest companies in America making it an
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extremely attractive company in the stock market. In 2001, Enron was ranked #5 on the Fortune
500 listing; then in a drastic turn, during that same year, Enron filed for bankruptcy citing a third
quarter loss of $618 million and a $1.2 billion reduction in owner’s equity. This abrupt change in
Enron’s profitability prompted the SEC’s official investigation of the company. The
investigation led to Enron announcing that the company had overstated its profits by $586
million over the last 5 years, essentially wiping out all its profits. Through their investigation, the
SEC discovered an alarming amount of accounting errors in Enron’s books, which led the SEC,
as well as the public, to question the reliability of Enron’s executives and their auditor, Arthur
Andersen.
Enron hid their internal problems extremely well until the company began its downward
spiral. One of Enron’s biggest issues was weak internal controls throughout the company, which
enabled its executives to perpetrate fraud. Furthermore, the company’s management did not
contain men of high integrity or character. Since the fraud at Enron has been exposed, former
employees have said that Kenneth Lay, the company’s CEO, did not like to pay attention to the
details of management. These details that he believed to be unimportant were, in fact, material
and greatly impacted Enron’s survival in the marketplace (Bierman 41). Enron also favored
aggressive accounting practices. The aggressiveness of these practices were so intense that it
prompted an anonymous letter to Lay stating that because of Enron’s questionable accounting
methods, the writer feared that Enron would “implode in a wave of accounting scandals”
(Bierman 42). After the fraud at Enron became publically know, Sherron Watkins, a vice
president for Corporate Development at Enron, admitted to being the letter’s author. While so
many issues were transpiring and being questioned internally, the outside world only saw
Enron’s false financial statements, thus viewed Enron as a thriving company.
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Since 1986, Arthur Andersen had been auditing Enron. Because of the long-standing
relationship between the companies, Robert Bryce claims that by the end of the 1990’s, Arthur
Andersen was extremely reliant on Enron as a client, so much so that the firm could not have
survived without Enron as a client (237). This revelation alone potentially explains why so much
“escaped” the auditors at Arthur Andersen. During my interview of Dr. Joseph Carcello, he
explained that Arthur Andersen had just experienced a separation with Andersen Consulting,
which made the firm extremely vulnerable. With the loss of its consulting practice, an extremely
profitable part of the firm, Arthur Andersen created its own consulting function within the firm.
The creation of this consulting function led to a greater emphasis on that and less of an emphasis
on auditing and its professional standards. According to Barbara Ley Toffler, after the split of
Andersen Consulting and Arthur Andersen, the “mantra of the day” became “perform or get
purged” (69). Toffler suggests that it was this type of firm culture that led to Andersen
employees allowing Enron to commit fraud. Due to the split of the firms, Toffler claims that an
excessive amount of energy and time was spent on the firm’s feelings of frustration and rage
against their former sister company that could have and should have otherwise been focused on
seeing the misconduct of clients (70).
Although Arthur Andersen is not the only one to blame for Enron’s ability to commit
fraud, the accounting firm did play a large role. A major downfall of the firm was that it did not
keep Enron’s board aware of their concerns regarding Enron’s financials. The auditors were
aware that Enron possessed a large amount of risk that the public was not knowledgeable of, but
made no attempt to rectify that (Bierman 136). Although a good number of the misstatements on
Enron’s financials were due to genuinely inadvertent errors, many of the errors were a
ramification of large-scale fraud and collapse of auditing standards and policies (Garner 7). The
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biggest failing and the one that sealed Arthur Andersen’s failure as an accounting firm was their
shredding of documents after the fraud at Enron was exposed. Knowing that the firm would be
investigated, David Duncan, a partner on the Enron account, advised several Andersen
employees to begin the shredding of documents relating to the fraud at Enron (Toffler 214-216).
Once the firm admitted to their shredding of documents, Arthur Andersen became the focal point
of America’s hatred, which ultimately led to the firm having to shut its doors on August 31, 2002
(“Arthur Andersen Goes Out of Business”).

WorldCom and Arthur Andersen:
Shortly after the fall of Enron, WorldCom, a large telecommunications company based
out of Mississippi had its fraud exposed, resulting in the largest bankruptcy in United States’
history. The fraud at WorldCom was a product of CEO Bernie Ebbers’s business strategy of
acquisitions, which led to the company having $41 billion in debt (Romero and Atlas). One of
the primary differences between the fraud at Enron and the fraud at WorldCom was the difficulty
of execution. The WorldCom fraud was exceedingly simple.
Starting in 1998 until 2000, WorldCom continuously decreased its “reserve accounts held
to cover liabilities of acquired companies” (AICPA). By doing so over those two years, the
company managed to increase its revenues by $2.8 billion; however, this alone became
insufficient to save the company and keep its investors happy, thus in December of 2000, an
email was sent to a WorldCom office in Texas from the CFO instructing them to misclassify the
company’s operating expenses as long-term investments. The CFO’s instruction to misclassify
these expenses was a command worth $3.85 billion, which drastically increased WorldCom’s net
income and their earnings per share (AICPA). Despite these large adjustments to WorldCom’s
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financials, it was not until 2002 that WorldCom’s internal auditors began to look into the
accounting practices that had taken place over the past four years. With more and more
questionable accounting being discovered in WorldCom’s wireless division, Cynthia Cooper,
WorldCom’s Vice President of Internal Audit, began searching for documents to support the
company’s accounting decisions. After the internal audit team at WorldCom discovered more
unusual entries, Cooper decided to contact WorldCom’s external auditor, Arthur Andersen,
where she was told by an Andersen partner that “any aggressive accounting entries in wireless
[were] balanced out on a corporationwide basis” (Farrell). After this talk, Cooper was contacted
by WorldCom’s CFO, Scott Sullivan, telling her not to speak to the company’s external auditor
about these accounting entries again, leading Cooper to the realization that fraud was present
within her company and she needed to expose it (Farrell).
Although the executives at WorldCom did a relatively good job at covering their
fraudulent activity, according to CRN, because the fraud at WorldCom was so basic, there is no
excuse as to why Arthur Andersen did not catch the fraud. This extensive auditing oversight is
what led to Arthur Anderson’s demise (“Arthur Andersen at Center of Scandal Again”). It was
“the WorldCom debacle [that] demolished what was left of Arthur Andersen’s reputation” (Jeter
207).

Implementation of SOX:
After the myriad of accounting frauds that took place in the early 2000’s, investors
throughout the world needed a reason to trust American companies and auditors again. With the
failing of Enron and WorldCom alone, investors lost around 254 billion dollars and about
320,000 employees lost their jobs (Ferrell). With numbers as staggering as these, the need for
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reform within the business industry was unquestionable. According to Robert Mueller, “the
collapse of Enron was devastating to tens of thousands of people and shook the public’s
confidence in corporate America.” Not only did the frauds expose major financial statement
errors that needed to be addressed, it also uncovered a major issue with regard to the morals of
executives. Even after the Enron fraud was exposed, Kenneth Lay claimed that he did nothing
criminal. Based on what Arthur Andersen allowed Enron and WorldCom to get away with, it
was abundantly clear that “none of the checks and balances that were supposed to prevent insider
abuse worked; the supposedly independent players were compromised” (Krugman).
All of the issues that were uncovered with regard to both business and accounting pointed
to one obvious action- change needed to happen, and it needed to happen fast. With that in mind,
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 into law, which is regarded as “the most
sweeping set of new business regulations since the 1930’s (“The 10 Worst Corporate Accounting
Scandals of All Time”).

Breakdown of the Sections of SOX:
Within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, there are 11 titles, all of which address certain
shortcomings of the accounting industry that were exposed during the fraud investigations. Title
I establishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). With the
establishment of the PCAOB came the end of self-regulation in the accounting industry. Title I
establishes the PCAOB as a non-governmental entity, but it is overseen by the SEC (Ayers 3).
As was seen with regard to Arthur Andersen’s involvement in both the Enron and WorldCom
frauds, accounting firms had too much power and not enough outside regulation, which allowed
them to push the limits of their autonomy. Currently, all public accounting firms are required to
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register with the PCAOB, and their audits are subject to random inspection. That said, the
PCAOB is the primary oversight body for public accounting firms.
Auditor Independence is the subject Title II. A major reason why Enron was able to hide
their fraud from the public was their close relationship with Arthur Andersen. The client and firm
were so intertwined that Arthur Andersen auditors and consultants had permanent offices at
Enron’s headquarters. The auditors also participated in Enron’s employee ski trips to Colorado
(Herrick and Barrionuevo). The goal of an auditor is to give the public an unbiased opinion on a
company’s financial statements; however, when auditors and clients have this close of a
relationship, it is hard to believe that anything the auditor reports is unbiased. Title II attempts to
restore the trust in an auditor’s opinion by restoring the necessary independence. This section
limits the types of services that an external auditor can perform for its clients. It also limits the
amount of time that auditors can work on a specific company. David Duncan, the partner in
charge of Enron’s audit, worked on this audit for five years, had an office in Enron’s building,
and he and Enron’s chief accounting officer were extremely friendly outside the office
(Raghavan).
Title III addresses corporate responsibility. With this title, all public companies are
required to create an independent audit committee that is charged with hiring the external
auditor, paying the auditors, overseeing the auditors, and dealing with any issues that may arise.
Keeping the audit committee independent of management allows the auditor to have a group to
report to if any unethical behavior arises. For example, according to a former Enron executive, in
a meeting once with an auditor from Arthur Andersen, Enron needed an opinion letter from the
firm supporting their claim for $270 million in tax credits. Although the auditor at first refused,
the Enron employees made it apparent that they would not let the auditor leave until they
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received the opinion letter they wanted (Garner 12). In situations such as these, the auditor now
has an independent party that ideally will support them with decisions such as the one above.
This title also forces the CEO and CFO to take a greater responsibility with regard to the
company’s financial statements. These two executives must certify for both quarterly and annual
reports that they have examined the reports and believe that the financials are a fair
representation of the company’s financial position. Another major provision of this title is that if
the CEO and CFO certify the financial statements, but later the financials must be reissued
because of noncompliance with GAAP, they must return any bonuses that they obtained a year
after the restatement of the financials. This should alleviate any incentives that executives may
have to falsely adjust their company’s financials.
The fourth title concentrates on enhanced financial disclosures. After the fall of Enron
and WorldCom, a similar weakness in internal controls was discovered at both companies. This
weakness undoubtedly played a role in the company’s ability to hide fraud for the amount of
time that they did (Bainbridge 155). To resolve that issue, Congress decided with the passing of
SOX that both managers and auditors must assess a public company’s internal controls. The
company must also disclose any material adjustments determined by the auditor. This will allow
for additional transparency between the company and its investors.
Title V discusses analysts’ conflicts of interest. The need for analysts to be truly
independent and unbiased came about after Jack Grubman, a well-known Wall Street analyst,
admitted that he rated WorldCom’s stock too high for too long (Ferrell 3). Jack Grubman was
known to be close with the WorldCom CEO, and so with this admission came the scrutiny of
investors and the SEC wondering if Grubman was a little too close to the telecommunications
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company (4). This section also requires that analysts disclose to the public any potential conflicts
of interest (Ayers 10).
Under Title VI, which discusses commission resources and authority, the SEC is to hire
two hundred professionals whose job it will be to monitor the accounting profession.
Additionally, this title increases the funding that the SEC was previously receiving. With the
extra employees and money, the goal is to have better oversight of auditors, auditor practices,
and the accounting profession in general (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
Studies and reports is the focus of Title VII. Under this title, the General Accounting
Office (GAO) and the SEC shall perform five studies. Those studies and their reports will be
focused on the consolidation of public accounting firms, credit rating agencies, violators and
violations within the profession, enforcement actions, and investment banks (Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002). The goal of these studies is to give both the GAO and the SEC a better
understanding of factors that in the past may have led to fraudulent activity and factors that, in
the future, may contribute to the presence of fraud.
Title VIII, which covers corporate and criminal fraud accountability, details the
punishments and penalties for violating any laws. This section increases the maximum
sentencing to twenty years for anyone that “alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up,
falsifies, or makes a false entry” in any documents or papers that may be used as evidence within
an investigation. This section directly correlates with the shredding of Enron documents by
Arthur Andersen employees (Toffler 214-216). On top of that, this title requires external
auditors to maintain documents that are relevant to their audits for a minimum of 5 years, and if
the auditor fails to do so, he may be imprisoned for a maximum of ten years (Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002). This title also focuses on the protection of whistleblowers. Whistleblowers played
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an incredibility vital role in the exposure of the fraud at both Enron and WorldCom. Without the
help of Cynthia Cooper (WorldCom) and Sherron Watkins (Enron), the fraud at these companies
may not have been discovered when it was, and because of their importance, this section enacts a
maximum imprisonment of ten years to any person that intentionally retaliates against a
whistleblower.
Title IX addresses white-collar crime penalty enhancements. This title dramatically
increases the maximum imprisonment time for criminal activities, increasing it from five to
twenty-five years. This section also introduces punishments for CEO’s and CFO’s that certify
financials that do not meet the requirements laid out in Sarbanes-Oxley (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002).
Title X covers corporate tax returns, requiring that a company’s CEO sign the income tax
return (Ayers 13).
The final section of SOX, Title XI: corporate fraud and accountability, details directions
for a company to follow if it is under review for violations. This title gives a maximum of twenty
years sentencing for anyone who impedes an official investigation (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002). It also allows the SEC to prevent companies from making any abnormal payments to
executives during the company’s period of investigation.

Interviews about SOX Today:
Twelve years after the passing of SOX into law, there are many varying opinions on what
SOX has done for the American business world. To gain an understanding of the varying
opinions on this act, it is imperative to talk to accountants who have had a first-hand experience
with the changes implemented by Sarbanes-Oxley.

Elkins 14
As previously stated, Dr. Joseph Carcello has served on multiple PCAOB advisory
groups, thus has an incredible understanding about what the PCAOB desires Sarbanes-Oxley to
accomplish, and what it actually has accomplished. According to Dr. Carcello, during the period
of the Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and HealthSouth scandals, he said, “it felt like there was a fraud
a week.” Having so many frauds come out at once showed a “systematic failure within the audit
profession” (Carcello). When asked what he believed to be the reason that these companies were
able to perform fraudulent activities for quite some time, he said that he believed it was “the
perfect storm.” According to Dr. Carcello, because large-scale fraud is relatively rare, it is hard
to find. “If a senior management team wants to commit fraud, it is pretty easy because the audit
committee and external auditors trust management. If they didn’t, they wouldn’t be there”
(Carcello). Not only that, but the issues at Enron and WorldCom transpired around the same time
that their auditor Arthur Andersen’s consulting practice was splitting from the firm. Losing their
consulting practice made Arthur Andersen start to focus more on the building of a new
consulting practice, than they did on auditing, which lead to some low quality auditing
(Carcello). Dr. Carcello believes that Sarbanes-Oxley was implemented for three main purposes:
to remove self-regulation from the public accounting industry, to impose greater responsibility
on senior executives of companies, and to provide a greater responsibility and obligation on the
audit committee. When asked if he believes that SOX has accomplished all that it set out to, he
says, “I think things are clearly better. The PCAOB has made improvements in focusing the
firms on auditing. The attention and resources that auditing gets has improved, but it probably
hasn’t been enough.” He claims that companies would say that since the passage of SOX, the
financial qualities have improved and internal controls are better since management, as well as
the external auditor, has to issue a separate opinion on a company’s system of internal controls.
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Although he does admit that the discussion of the cost versus the benefits of the implementation
of SOX is a completely different conversation. According to Dr. Carcello, although SarbanesOxley has accomplished a lot in its first twelve years, “there are problems that are still happening
that need to be resolved” (Carcello).
Barry Elkins has seen audits from the side of an auditor in a public accounting firm, as
well as from an executive of a public corporation being audited. With these experiences have
come a deep understanding of the way in which audits work and a greater awareness of the
standards to which the accounting profession holds its members. Although Mr. Elkins agrees that
there were issues within the accounting industry, he does not think that the passing of SarbanesOxley was necessary. He believes that if the internal control standards that were already in place
had been properly enforced, there would have been no reason to pass SOX. According to Mr.
Elkins, “SOX didn’t add anything. Legitimate companies were already doing 95% of everything
that SOX implemented.” In his opinion, the only change that came about with SOX was its
increasing the cost of an audit by hundreds of thousands of dollars. At Direct General, the
implementation of SOX increased their audit cost by at least $100,000 (Elkins). When asked
about whether he believed having the executives of a company sign off on the company’s
financials was beneficial, Mr. Elkins responded by saying, “adding a signature from the CEO
and CFO to attest that everything was done was useless. It was just so they could sue us. If
someone was going to cheat, they were going to cheat, regardless of if they signed their name.”
In Mr. Elkins’s opinion, the greatest downfall of SOX has been “the layer of bureaucracy that it
added.” According to him, part of the problem was the accounting industry itself. It wasn’t that
the government needed to be more vocal about what was already being done (Elkins). He
believes that the best action the government could have taken would have been to simply make
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small adjustments to the laws and regulations that were already in place. In Mr. Elkins’s opinion,
“SOX, itself, was unnecessary. The assessment of internal controls was already there. The
accounting industry dropped the ball, and then they let the feds squeeze in” (Elkins).

Conclusion:
Sarbanes-Oxley has inarguably been one of the most important acts to be passed in the
United States. SOX has affected the business industry as a whole, it has made adjustments to
what auditors do, and it has also helped companies gain back the trust of its investors. Depending
on who is talking, the opinions on SOX will undoubtedly vary making the conclusion of if
Sarbanes-Oxley was the right choice hard to answer.
The implementation of SOX has been a learning process not only businesspeople, but
also for the government. In the beginning, smaller companies were complaining about the
increased, unsustainable cost of audits after the changes brought about from SOX. Due to these
concerns, Congress passed the Small Business SOX Compliance Relief Act in 2009. This act
required the SEC to modify some of the requirements enacted by SOX for exempt small
businesses, especially with regard to “annual management assessments of, and reports on,
internal financial controls” (“H.R. 3775- Small Business SOX Compliance Relief Act”).
Although there will always be the debate about whether SOX enacted too much or not
enough regulation, all-in-all there seems to be a general consensus that some form of a change
needed to happen after the frauds of the early 2000’s. Although some people may believe there
were other, more logical choices than passing SOX, accountants and businesspeople seem to
appreciate the increased protection from fraud that SOX has brought with it. According to Ernst
& Young, “at [the] ten year anniversary of Sarbanes-Oxley, corporate governance is stronger,
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[and] audit quality is improved” (Tanna). In addition to Ernst & Young’s opinion, Kaya Gillan, a
writer for The New York Times, states that the greatest effect of SOX has been that,
Those who would seek to provide the market with misleading numbers are less likely to
be able to do so because the public company internal controls are now much more
effective; independent auditors comply with stronger standards and also have an
independent regulator to oversee their efforts on behalf of investors and other
stakeholders; audit committees must now be more competent and engaged in overseeing
the audit and financial reporting; and the Securities and Exchange Commission must now
spend more of its resources in reviewing the quality of information that companies
provide to the market (Gillan).
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